Executive Compensation in American Unions by Hallock, Kevin & Klein, Felice B.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Institute for Compensation Studies Centers, Institutes, Programs 
6-17-2011 
Executive Compensation in American Unions 
Kevin Hallock 
Cornell University, kfh7@cornell.edu 
Felice B. Klein 
Cornell University, fbk3@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers, Institutes, Programs at 
DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in Institute for Compensation Studies by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Executive Compensation in American Unions 
Abstract 
[Exerpt] Studying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult. In nonprofit organizations, it is not 
always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to 
consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector. This paper investigates the 
determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions. We use panel data on more 
than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007 which allows us to examine within union 
differences over time. We specifically concentrate on two issues of importance to unions – the level of 
membership and the wages of union members. Both measures are strongly related to the compensation 
of the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for organization size and individual 
organization fixed-effects. That is, within the same union, higher levels of membership size and average 
member wage over time are associated with higher levels of pay for union leaders. Additionally, the 
elasticity of pay with respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect 
to employees in for-profit firms over the same period. 
Keywords 
compensation, unions, nonprofits 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Hallock, K. F. & Klein, F. (2011). executive compensation in american unions (ICS 2011-005). Retrieved 
[insert date] from Cornell University, ILR School, Institute for Compensation Studies site: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics/9 
Note: This paper is an updated version of the paper found here. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ics/9 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Executive Compensation in American Unions 
 
 
June 17, 2011 
 
  
 
 
  
  
Kevin F. Hallock  
Cornell University and NBER  
  
and  
  
Felice B. Klein  
Cornell University  
  
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
We are grateful to David Card, John DiNardo, David Lee, Brian McCall, Thomas Lemieux, two 
anonymous referees and the editor for very helpful suggestions and to the ILR School at Cornell 
University for financial support. 
 2
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION IN AMERICAN UNIONS 
 
 
 
 Studying compensation in the nonprofit sector is difficult.  In nonprofit organizations, it is not 
always clear what the objectives of the organization are and, therefore, perhaps even more difficult to 
consider how to compensate managers than in the for-profit sector.  This paper investigates the 
determinants of executive compensation of leaders of American labor unions.  We use panel data on more 
than 75,000 organization-years of unions from 2000 to 2007 which allows us to examine within union 
differences over time.  We specifically concentrate on two issues of importance to unions – the level of 
membership and the wages of union members.  Both measures are strongly related to the compensation of 
the leaders of American labor unions, even after controlling for organization size and individual 
organization fixed-effects.  That is, within the same union, higher levels of membership size and average 
member wage over time are associated with higher levels of pay for union leaders.  Additionally, the 
elasticity of pay with respect to membership for unions is very similar to the elasticity of pay with respect 
to employees in for-profit firms over the same period.   
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I. Introduction and Motivation 
 
This paper investigates the determinants and structure of executive compensation of the 
leaders of American labor unions.  There has been considerable research into the determinants of 
managerial pay in for-profit companies in the United States (e.g. Murphy, 1985; Murphy 1999; 
Bebchuk and Fried, 2006).  However, considerably less attention has been placed on 
compensation (and executive compensation in particular) in nonprofit organizations.  Only 
recently have authors begun to investigate the compensation of managers in nonprofits (e.g. 
Oster, 1998; Hallock, 2002) and even made some comparisons between managerial pay in for-
profit and nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2004).   
Studying managerial compensation in nonprofit organizations is particularly difficult since 
the goals and objectives of these organizations are less clear than they are in the for-profit sector.  
While many argue that for-profit companies are organized principally to create returns for 
shareholders, the objectives of nonprofits may differ quite dramatically.  One issue that comes 
out of previous research on compensation in nonprofits is the need to focus attention on 
particular industries within the nonprofit sector since the objectives of nonprofits may 
dramatically differ across industries (e.g. Ehrenberg, Cheslock, and Epifantseva, 2002 who study 
universities or Bertrand, Hallock, and Arnould, 2005 who study hospitals).  Nursing homes is an 
example where a potentially important objective could be considered (Weisbrod and Schlesinger, 
1986).  Perhaps one would want to compensate a manager of a nursing home based on 
“trustworthiness,” but this is incredibly difficult to measure.  Other measures of performance in 
nonprofits include increased public awareness, cost savings, increased funding (Rocco, 1991), 
and customer satisfaction (Bailey and Risher, 1996).  It is clear from these examples that 
identifying appropriate measures for the goals and objectives of nonprofits is complicated.  
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The work reported in this paper is an attempt to carefully consider how the leaders of labor 
unions are paid in the United States.  Labor unions are particularly interesting because they 
represent a case where the objectives of the leader and the organization are, perhaps, better 
defined (and measurable) than in other nonprofit sectors.  Clearly, unions are interested in both 
the level of membership and the level of wages of their members (French, Hayashi, and Gray, 
1983)1.  As described below, we collect data on each and empirically determine their relative 
importance in an executive compensation empirical specification.  This may be a way to consider 
an implicit objective function for the leader. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section II discusses some previous literature 
on the compensation of executives in nonprofits and in unions in particular.  Section III explores 
the collection and organization of the data.  Section IV reports the main empirical results and 
Section V offers some concluding comments.  We find that there is wide heterogeneity in how 
labor unions compensate their leaders.  Further, the effect of union membership is large and 
significantly related to the compensation of the union President, with elasticities on the same 
order of magnitude as the elasticity of compensation with respect to firm market value or the 
elasticity of compensation with respect to employees for publicly traded firms.  Similarly, the 
average wage of the rank and file union member is related to the pay of union presidents.  In the 
end, both union membership and wages of members are importantly related to the pay of union 
Presidents. 
 
II. Previous Work, Econometric Specification, and Issues 
 
Previous work has shown that one of the strongest correlates of managerial pay in American 
nonprofits (Hallock, 2002) and for-profit organizations (Lambert, Larker, and Weigelt, 1993; 
                                                 
1
 Fiorito, Jarley and Delaney (1995) consider union effectiveness in organizing. 
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Murphy, 1985) is the size of the organization.  Size is believed to have such a high correlation 
with manager’s pay because managers in larger organizations have responsibility for more 
resources and more people.  Although managers of nonprofits are paid considerably less than 
those in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2002; Preston, 1989), a great deal of this is explained by the 
size of the organization (measured for example by total assets).  However, for organizations of 
similar size, it has been found that non-equity-based compensation is not particularly different in 
nonprofit organizations than in for-profit firms (Hallock, 2004)2.  In addition, Hansmann (1980; 
1996) and others outline that nonprofit organizations are not barred from making “profits,” but 
they are barred from distributing the excess funds to those in control of the organization.  
However, it is possible to compensate managers of nonprofits with incentive-based pay 
(Steinberg, 1990a; 1990b). “One way to minimize the probability that executives will take 
actions contrary to the organization’s goals is to tie their compensation to measures of their 
organization’s performance” (Ehrenberg and Goldberg, 1977, p. 188).  We investigate a variety 
of issues that have been hallmarks in the study of compensation of managers in for-profit firms 
including the elasticity of pay to organization size (Rosen, 1992) and the relationship between 
organization performance and executive pay (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Tosi, Werner, Katz, and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2000).  As noted above, examining unions provides a unique view on the 
importance of organization performance, measured as wages of members and membership 
levels, to the compensation of the top union official3.   
                                                 
2
 At the same time, equity compensation in for-profit firms is often an important fraction of total compensation. 
3
 One referee noted that size is an important proxy for many other factors.  We agree with this and further while we 
agree that size is often (but not always) thought as a control in executive compensation studies, we think it is a bit 
different here.  In particular, in publicly traded firms, although shareholders may be interested in revenue or profit 
growth or growth in the workforce, they are probably primarily ultimately interested in shareholder returns.  
However, the “shareholder” analogy in the labor union is, in our minds, the union members.  So we feel that it is not 
unreasonable to consider both changes in membership and changes in average wages of members as important 
measures of performance.  Further, we include the variable of firm assets, which can also be thought of as a control 
for firm size.   
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 A small set of previous studies have investigated the links between the compensation of 
union Presidents and certain union characteristics.  Each of the studies uses only cross sectional 
data.  We briefly mention six of them here.  Bressler (1972) examined the compensation of 97 
local union presidents in the construction industry in 1967 by regressing annual compensation of 
the top official on membership size, total net worth of membership, and the hourly wage rate of 
workers.  He found that all were significantly associated with compensation at the 0.01 
confidence level, and concluded that “union officials are not unaffected by the agreements they 
negotiate” (pg. 49).  Ehrenberg and Goldberg (1977) investigated the performance and 
compensation of the 670 heads of building trade unions in 1971.  They found that the salary of a 
local business agent of a union is related to the “ability to pay” (defined as total dues and total 
assets) and to his own bargaining performance (measured by absolute level of wages and relative 
wages compared to wages in and outside their craft).  Sandver (1978) examined 100 large local 
unions using data from 1962, 1967 and 1973.  He found, among other results, that membership 
was significantly related to the compensation of the head of the unions he examined.  Sandver 
and Heneman (1980) studied the relationship among the top three highest paid officials in the 
100 largest national unions in 1962, 1967 and 1973.  Among their findings is that there was a 
stable relationship (over time) between the pay of the top officer and the second two officers, 
similar to that found in for-profit companies.  French, Hayashi and Gray (1983), using data from 
1978, showed a relationship between union head’s compensation and measures of union 
financial strength, job complexity (measured with the variables: number of locals, functional 
specialization of administration, industrial diversity of membership, and geographical dispersion 
of membership), and tenure in the job.  Finally, French (1992) investigated the relationship 
between power and pay of 136 international unions in 1977 and 108 international unions in 1987.  
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French defined power in his analysis by the procedures and structures used by unions to elect its 
officers.  More autocratic structures (indicated by longer presidential terms of office, longer 
intervals between conventions, the election of presidents at conventions, and the election of the 
board on an at-large basis) were argued to create more power for union presidents.  French found 
support for the hypothesis that power and pay were positively related.   
As previously noted, none of the previous studies on the compensation of union Presidents 
made use of panel data.  On the other hand, we investigated a panel of eight years, from 2000 
through 2007.  Therefore, one of the issues not addressed in previous studies, that of unmeasured 
heterogeneity of the organizations themselves, can be addressed in our work.   
Our main empirical specification considers the determinants of compensation of the 
President of the union as follows:   
  
lnPit = β ln Mit + γ lnWit + θ ln Ait + α i + εit  (1) 
where P is the total compensation of the President of the labor union, M is total membership in 
the labor union, W is the average wage of union members4 (defined below), A is the total assets 
of the labor unions, i indexes unions, t indexes time, and (α i + εit ) is the composite error term 
containing possible permanent effects. No doubt, average total compensation of the members 
(including pensions, benefits etc.) would be a better measure than W.  However, we do not have 
access to such data and assume that pensions and benefits are highly correlated with the wage in 
these organizations. 
Clearly, however, the set of organization characteristics does not fully explain the 
relationship between compensation and membership and member wages (see the R2 values in the 
OLS specifications below), and therefore, in some specifications, we have chosen to allow for 
                                                 
4
 A more complicated specification may replace the average wage of union members with the union wage relative to 
the non-union wage.  We do not explore that in this paper. 
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the possibility that other characteristics of the Presidents and the unions which have not been 
included thus far in previous research are confounding our investigation of the link among these 
key variables. 
To help remedy this problem, we make use of the benefits of the panel data.  We can 
assume that the source of the endogeneity arises only through the permanent component of the 
error term, iα , and not through the transitory component, itε , then the standard fixed-effects 
estimation of equation (1) will yield consistent estimates of the parameters.  This essentially 
allows us to control for everything that is fixed with respect to the union over time and look at 
how changes in performance affect changes in top officer pay within unions over time. 
 
 
III. Data 
 
The data for this paper come from LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 reports filed by each labor 
organization from 2000 – 2007 (inclusive)5 that is subject to the Labor-Management Reporting 
and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), and the Foreign Service 
Act (FSA).  The forms disclose a common set of information for all labor unions.  Individual 
data include information such as liabilities, loans, mortgages, dividends, rents, gifts and grants, 
investments, members of the unions, total dues paid, and compensation of the president6.  We 
focus on only a sub-set of the information in the LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 forms.  In all, we study 
75,717 organization-years of data for 15,942 unique organizations. 
 We also categorize labor unions as “International,” “Intermediate” or “Local” based on 
the United States Department of Labor Office of Labor-Management Standards’ classification.  
                                                 
5
 LM-2, LM-3, and LM-4 data are actually available back to 1959 (the date of the passage of the Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act) on microfilm.  We are in beginning stages of collecting data from years prior to 2000. 
6
 It may be possible that the president of a specific union in our data also receives pay from another source (or 
union).  Our data are unable to detect this.   
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International unions are the highest branch of a union representing workers in the United States 
and Canada, intermediate unions are the administrative structures situated between the 
international union headquarters and the locals that represent workers in a number of different 
locals based on geography, industry, sector, etc.7, and local unions are the lowest branch of the 
international union representing workers at a particular plant or in a particular geographic area 
(Chaison, 2006).  Much of the analysis below will be done separately for each of these three 
categories of labor unions.  
 We begin by considering summary statistics for only international unions in Table 1a.  It 
is clear from the table that the average (nominal) union president compensation over time in 
these data is $141,859, with a median of $112,235.  Figure 1 shows that this average increased 
considerably over time (from $111,211 in 2000 to $213,391 in 2007).  The average international 
union had 108,848 members.  The median number of members is much smaller (11,642) due to 
the fact that some of the international unions are so large.  The average level of assets for the 
international unions over this time is $36.4 million and the total annual dues is $17.3 million.  
We also created an estimate of the average union member wage, 
 W = (D/0.015)/M, (3) 
where D = total annual dues of the union, M is the total union’s membership, and we assume that 
1.5% of the union members’ pay is contributed to the labor union as dues.8  Using the formula in 
equation (3), we computed that the average member of an international labor union during this 
                                                 
7
 For example, the Steelworkers of America has 12 different districts that are arranged geographically and also have 
two different industry sections, i.e. the Rubber and Plastic Industry Conference and the Aluminum, Brick, and Glass 
Workers Division (Chaison, 2006, pg. 37).   
8
 See Rasian (1983) for further discussion of the appropriateness of the assumption that union members pay, on 
average, between 1.13% and 1.6% of their wages in union dues.  We study the robustness of our “1.5% assumption” 
to our results below. 
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time earned $42,1119.  Tables 1b and 1c report summary statistics for intermediate and local 
labor unions, respectively.  There are clearly substantially more intermediate union-years of data 
in our intermediate sample (3,934) than international (362).  There are still more local (71,397).  
The tables clearly show that local unions pay their presidents substantially less than and are 
smaller than (in terms of assets and membership) intermediate unions, which are substantially 
smaller than international unions.  However, the estimate for the average wage of intermediate 
union members is substantially higher than the average member wage of locals and 
internationals. As noted above, this number is an estimate, and the anomaly comes from the fact 
that there are small numbers for members in the intermediate unions.   
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
As is clear from equation (1) we are interested in testing whether membership and average 
wages of members are two primary goals of labor unions. If the union wants to align the interests 
of its leader with that of its membership, then it seems reasonable that these two measures would 
be related to the pay of the head of the union.  In addition, we include a measure of organization 
size (total assets) as this may represent a union’s ability to increase membership and wages. 
To begin, consider Figure 2, which plots the natural logarithm of the President salary against 
the natural logarithm of the membership, by year for local unions10.  Visually, there appears to be 
a positive relationship between the two.  Another measure of organization scale or success could 
be assets.  Figure 3 (organized similar to Figure 2) plots the relationship between the natural 
                                                 
9
 One referee noted that the salaries of international union leaders increased 100 percent over the seven year period 
while the salaries of members remained flat.  This is an important point but is aligned with what is going on in for-
profit firms.  While most worker pay has stayed flat (even adjusting for inflation over the last 30 years, wages at the 
75 percentile in the US have been flat), there has been dramatic growth of pay for those earning in the top 5 percent 
of the wage distribution, including union leaders (Hallock, 2011).   
10
 The relationships are very similar for international and intermediate unions and those figures are omitted here for 
brevity but are available upon request 
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logarithm of pay of the union Presidents against the natural logarithm of the assets in his or her 
organization in local unions (Figure 3)11.  Figure 4 plots the natural logarithm of the unions 
President’s pay against the estimated average union member wage for local unions as computed 
in equation (2)12.  It is clear from Figure 4 that the relationship between the President pay and the 
estimated average wage of the members is less positive than the relationship between union 
President pay and union membership or between union President pay and union assets. 
Table 2 displays results from specifications like that of equation (1) for only international 
unions.  In column (1) we regress the natural log of President compensation on the natural log of 
membership and estimate a large and significant elasticity of 0.338.  Column (2) repeats this 
exercise using the natural log of the estimated average union member wage as the independent 
variable.  The estimated coefficient is much smaller (0.106) but also statistically significantly 
different from zero13.  In column (3) we do the analysis again only controlling for the natural log 
of assets.  The estimated elasticity is 0.394 and statistically significantly different from zero.  
Columns (4) – (7) investigate various combinations of these covariates and include year effects 
(in column 7).  Column (7) suggests that all three independent variables (ln(membership), 
ln(estimated average wage) and ln(assets)) are significantly related to the compensation of the 
union President.   The R2 = 0.623 suggests that quite a large fraction of the variation in the pay of 
the union head is explained by variation in the independent variables, and quite a bit more than in 
a typical study of for-profit CEO compensation (Murphy, 1999).    
                                                 
11
 Again the results are similar in international and intermediate unions and the figures are available upon requests. 
12
 Again the results are similar in international and intermediate unions and the figures are available upon requests. 
13
 In order to calculate the average member wage, we assumed that wages represent 1.5% of total dues.  In order to 
check the robustness of this assumption, we repeated the analysis reported in tables 2, 3 and 4 by creating a set of 15 
new tables (5 for each of tables 2, 3 and 4).  In each of these tables we replaced the assumption of 1.5 percent with, 
0.5 percent, 1 percent, 2 percent, 2.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively.  We found that the coefficients in tables 2, 
3 and 4 are remarkably consistent with their 5 counterpart tables (available upon request).   
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A virtue of our data, however, is that we have multiple observations (up to eight each) on the 
compensation of the President and union characteristics for each union in sample.  Column (8) of 
Table 2 uses this information and controls for organization fixed-effects in the specification of 
international union president compensation.  Column (8) displays the results of equation (2).  
This produces some interesting results.  Even controlling for organization fixed-effects, there is a 
positive relationship between international President wages and membership and president wages 
and estimated average worker wages, and both are significantly different from zero at the 0.05 
level.  That is, even when looking within unions, changes in wages and membership are related 
to higher levels of pay. 
Table 3 repeats the analysis of Table 2 but investigates the compensation of leaders of 
intermediate unions, rather than international unions.  Again, membership, estimated average 
worker wage and assets are all unconditionally related to the pay of the head of the intermediate 
union.  However, when we control for individual organization fixed-effects (in column 8), the 
relationship between President pay and membership is positive and significant (estimated 
elasticity of 0.166) and the relationship between President pay and estimated average worker pay 
is positive and significant (estimated elasticity of 0.180).  These two elasticities are both 
significantly different from zero and are statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
 Table 4 repeats the analysis for the local unions – the group for which we have 
overwhelmingly more data.  Throughout the table, the estimated coefficients are larger than they 
are in each of the previous tables.  When we look within organizations in column (8) of Table 4, 
we see that the elasticity of President compensation with respect to membership is 0.361 and the 
elasticity of President pay with respect to the estimated worker wage is 0.282.  Both of these 
elasticities are significantly different from zero.    
 13
 In summary, there seems to be a large and positive relationship between the 
compensation of the heads of American labor unions and the number of members they have in 
their union and the estimated average wage of those members.  Both variables matter. 
 
V. Concluding Comments 
 
A significant body of literature exists on the compensation of managers of firms in the 
United States (Murphy, 1999), with more recent research conducted on the compensation of 
managers in nonprofit organizations (Hallock, 2002). However, only a small number of studies 
have investigated the determinants of pay of top union officials, none examining these 
determinants longitudinally.  We hope this is a useful step in understanding the compensation of 
the presidents of American labor unions over time.  
The argument for the link between executive pay and organizational performance is clear: 
because executives are in charge of the success of the organization, part of their pay should be 
contingent on how well the organizations does (Jensen and Murphy, 1990).  Similar to for-profit 
firms, it appears that the pay of union Presidents is tied to the performance of the organization he 
or she leads.  We find that the pay level of top union officials is strongly correlated with the 
number of members within the union and the estimated wage for those members.  Further, we 
find these results in all three types of unions (international, intermediate, and local), and find 
these variables are significant when controlling for organization size (with the variable total 
assets), and even when controlling for organization (with organization fixed-effects). It appears 
that within unions, as the number of members and average member pay increases, the top union 
official’s pay also increases.  The results of our analysis are aligned with past studies conducted 
with cross-sectional data on the compensation of local union officers (Bressler, 1972; Ehrenberg 
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and Goldberg, 1977; Sandver, 1978), and national union officers (French et al., 1983; French, 
1992; Sandver and Heneman, 1980).   
The emergence of paid full-time union officials continues to be the subject of considerable 
debate (French, 1992).  Some analysts have argued that this development in labor unions ensures 
that the rewards of union leaders are tied to the membership’s goals (French, 1992; Kochan, 
1980).  Bok and Dunlop (1970) assert that replacing voluntary leaders with salaried officers has 
enhanced the effectiveness of collective bargaining and therefore advanced the interests of union 
members.  These authors state: “Union members have doubtless suffered far more from 
inefficient and unimaginative administration than they have ever lost through corruption and 
undemocratic processes” (pg. 90).  Whereas others, suggested in the quote above, have argued 
that the transition to full-time paid leadership may reduce the responsiveness of officials to 
interests of union members and has led to a decline in democratic practices within unions 
(French et al., 1983; Lipset, 1970).  These analysts believe that the compensation of union 
officials is related to their control over the rank-and-file (French, 1992).  The results of our study 
shed some light on this debate.  Our findings suggest that the pay of the union President is 
significantly related to at least some measures of the performance of the union.  In particular, the 
size of the membership and the average wage of members, are both positive and significantly 
related to the compensation of the union President.  Therefore, it appears the “administrative 
rationalization,” defined as “the making of union decisions through rules, organization and 
expertness rather than through trial by struggle, ideology and hit-or-miss” (Barbash, 1969, p. 
147), may have led to the betterment of the rank-and-file.   
Although the results of this study provide strong evidence that the compensation of union 
Presidents is linked to performance of the union, the findings and interpretations from this study 
 15
must remain tentative.  For example, a number of other factors important to the rank-and-file, 
such as benefits of members, relative wage of members, number of strikes, number of layoffs, 
etc., might influence the salaries of union presidents and have not been included in the present 
study.   
Prior to this study, little was known regarding the pay of union presidents especially since all 
of the previous work used cross-sectional data and could not examine changes within unions 
over time.  We hope the findings from this study enhance what we know about compensation in 
nonprofits and motivate further research in this area.   
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Table 1a. International. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
141859 
(137816) 
[112235] 
 
111211 
(89529) 
[100629] 
124185 
(106675) 
[106300] 
130152 
(111803) 
[109657] 
140557 
(118382) 
[117611] 
145211 
(126779) 
[114572] 
183822 
(151521) 
[131629] 
198270 
(268800) 
[122927] 
213391 
(161828) 
[175592] 
Members 
 
 
108848 
(361274) 
[11642] 
 
118496 
(370923) 
[8130] 
118439 
(382702) 
[11894] 
110712 
(1358391) 
[11540] 
63771 
(127843) 
[11750] 
99380 
(347853) 
[10782] 
183745 
(595487) 
[23205] 
 
134966 
(496932) 
[13847] 
114119 
(205867) 
[18519] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
42111 
(154831) 
[14270] 
 
36318 
(143783) 
[12395] 
39636 
(159392) 
[12747] 
39430 
(142516) 
[14168] 
38075 
(131220) 
[15448] 
36687 
(122368) 
[15255] 
24045 
(34302) 
[15696] 
94631 
(297679) 
[18277] 
32472 
(25097) 
[19160] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
36400 
(81800) 
[4294] 
 
32600 
(70000) 
[2405] 
 
33700 
(71500) 
[3856] 
33500 
(71500) 
[5238] 
32400 
(73100) 
[3960] 
35500 
(78900) 
[4216] 
45400 
(107000) 
[10300] 
39000 
(96500) 
[5022] 
118000 
(206000) 
[49300] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
17300 
(45100) 
[2180] 
 
16200 
(42800) 
[1761] 
17300 
(45900) 
[2191] 
17500 
(44700) 
[2545] 
13100 
(30600) 
[2583] 
17000 
(44600) 
[2386] 
26200 
(68900) 
[4162] 
19500 
(56800) 
[1799] 
31300 
(48800) 
[10400] 
N 362 53 55 62 66 66 21 32 7 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M = (total annual union dues / 0.015) / total union membership 
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Table 1b. Intermediate. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
64270 
(175730) 
[55485] 
 
49512 
(43033) 
[47851] 
 
58140 
(130421) 
[54477] 
68777 
(187233) 
[56767] 
76092 
(319119) 
[56601] 
62791 
(57551) 
[60648] 
66240 
(166461) 
[42164] 
71056 
(145642) 
[53076] 
52363 
(52363) 
[49915] 
Members 
 
 
6987 
(27366) 
[1894] 
 
6140 
(22026) 
[1873] 
5988 
(19470) 
[1905] 
7521 
(28725) 
[2012] 
7482 
(29472) 
[1950] 
7710 
(31627) 
[1912] 
6917 
(33043) 
[1489] 
 
7426 
(30397) 
[1726] 
4934 
(8853) 
[1712] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
153966 
(1200376) 
[11702] 
 
159832 
(1564272) 
[10345] 
158378 
(1340950) 
[11991] 
126585 
(877089) 
[11629] 
148768 
(990140) 
[11146] 
172960 
(1366815) 
[11958] 
96264 
(560751) 
[13132] 
195416 
(1293656) 
[13778] 
159988 
(733777) 
[12059] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
2021 
(7723) 
[130] 
 
1285 
(3981) 
[105] 
 
1476 
(4399) 
[139] 
1843 
(6667) 
[147] 
2065 
(7989) 
[136] 
2215 
(8456) 
[149] 
2742 
(10600) 
[98] 
3076 
(11100) 
[113] 
2783 
(11500) 
[165] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
1408 
(5119) 
[179] 
 
941 
(2850) 
[162] 
1064 
(3109) 
[183] 
1363 
(4656) 
[186] 
1424 
(5062) 
[185] 
1581 
(5693) 
[204] 
1764 
(6659) 
[145] 
2024 
(7650) 
[164] 
1682 
(6250) 
[198] 
N 3934 540 629 656 673 661 253 407 115 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 1c. Local. Summary Statistics 
 
 All Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
President 
Compensation 
 
26837 
(51552) 
[6052] 
 
22688 
(36801) 
[5298] 
 
25530 
(42121) 
[5999] 
27283 
(44649) 
[6528] 
28466 
(51853) 
[6591] 
29161 
(50176) 
[6674] 
22116 
(68370) 
[4800] 
29697 
(62114) 
[6217] 
33511 
(122509) 
[8829] 
Members 
 
 
865 
(4054) 
[235] 
 
799 
(3106) 
[235] 
912 
(4337) 
[241] 
928 
(4481) 
[243] 
907 
(4026) 
[241] 
940 
(4458) 
[242] 
600 
(4738) 
[182] 
 
745 
(2834) 
[230] 
837 
(3176) 
[254] 
Estimated Average 
Member Wagea 
 
35226 
(316499) 
[21465] 
 
29216 
(82143) 
[19567] 
30228 
(57159) 
[20637] 
33568 
(199482) 
[21513] 
37578 
(401473) 
[22271] 
39085 
(397678) 
[22713] 
42854 
(609844) 
[21037] 
38280 
(322593) 
[22830] 
46891 
(522586) 
[23607] 
Assets 
(in thousands) 
 
558 
(3106) 
[62] 
 
415 
(2017) 
[52] 
 
509 
(2398) 
[61] 
569 
(2994) 
[66] 
579 
(2770) 
[67] 
628 
(3304) 
[67] 
518 
(3848) 
[50] 
629 
(3675) 
[70] 
982 
(8092) 
[98] 
Total Annual Dues 
(in thousands) 
 
379 
(1670) 
[75] 
 
310 
(1209) 
[70] 
371 
(1583) 
[76] 
392 
(1601) 
[78] 
407 
(1731) 
[79] 
441 
(2043) 
[81] 
275 
(2047) 
[58] 
369 
(1338) 
[76] 
449 
(1996) 
[84] 
N 71397 10847 11782 12210 12273 11937 4386 6612 1350 
 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. Medians in brackets. 
a
 Estimated average member wage is defined as W = (D/0.015) / M 
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Table 2. International. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
 Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
    * p-value < .10  
  ** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.338*** 
(0.023) 
 
  0.017 
(0.029) 
 0.099*** 
(0.033) 
0.100*** 
(0.033) 
0.204** 
(0.095) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.106*** 
(0.034) 
  0.081*** 
(0.021) 
0.121*** 
(0.025) 
0.123*** 
(0.025) 
0.068** 
(0.028) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.394*** 
(0.017) 
0.382*** 
(0.026) 
0.391*** 
(0.016) 
0.320*** 
(0.028) 
0.320*** 
(0.029) 
- 0.045 
(0.046) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 8.160*** 
(0.222) 
 
10.328*** 
(0.325) 
5.372*** 
(0.256) 
5.393*** 
(0.259) 
4.665*** 
(0.313) 
4.449*** 
(0.317) 
4.477*** 
(0.366) 
9.613*** 
(1.107) 
Adj. R2 0.371 0.023 0.605 0.604 0.619 0.628 0.623 0.954 
N 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 362 
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Table 3. Intermediate. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
 Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.285*** 
(0.012) 
 
  0.015 
(0.011) 
 0.479*** 
(0.016) 
0.478*** 
(0.016) 
0.166*** 
(0.024) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.308*** 
(0.012) 
  0.183*** 
(0.010) 
0.518*** 
(0.014) 
0.517*** 
(0.014) 
0.180*** 
(0.019) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.440*** 
(0.008) 
0.434*** 
(0.010) 
0.398*** 
(0.008) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
0.096*** 
(0.013) 
 -0.013 
(0.015) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 8.150*** 
(0.088) 
 
7.392*** 
(0.110) 
4.935*** 
(0.102) 
4.911*** 
(0.104) 
3.772*** 
(0.115) 
0.853*** 
(0.144) 
0.683*** 
(0.173) 
7.556*** 
(0.347) 
Adj. R2 0.130 0.150 0.416 0.416 0.464 0.562 0.562 0.930 
N 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 3934 
 
 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
     * p-value < .10  
   ** p-value < .05 
 *** p-value < .01 
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Table 4. Local. “Determinants” of Union President Compensation 
 
Dependent Variable is Ln(President Compensation) 
 
 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
    * p-value < .10  
  ** p-value < .05 
*** p-value < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Ln(membership) 0.897*** 
(0.003) 
 
  0.523*** 
(0.004) 
 0.686*** 
(0.004) 
0.688*** 
(0.004) 
0.361*** 
(0.007) 
Ln(avg member 
wage) 
 
 
 
0.647*** 
(0.007) 
  0.347*** 
(0.005) 
0.584*** 
(0.005) 
0.583*** 
(0.005) 
0.282*** 
(0.006) 
Ln(assets)  
 
 
 0.633*** 
(0.002) 
0.356*** 
(0.003) 
0.600*** 
(0.002) 
0.215*** 
(0.003) 
0.213*** 
(0.003) 
-0.034*** 
(0.004) 
Year effects no 
 
no no no no no yes yes 
Org effects no no no no no no no yes 
         
Constant 3.989*** 
(0.019) 
 
2.543*** 
(0.072) 
1.889*** 
(0.026) 
2.080*** 
(0.024) 
-1.214*** 
(0.054) 
-3.079*** 
(0.047) 
-3.018*** 
(0.055) 
4.599*** 
(0.085) 
Adj. R2 0.520 0.101 0.514 0.592 0.542 0.663 0.664 0.942 
N 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 71397 
